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NOTE
Food Stamp Trafficking: Why Small Groceries Need
Judicial Protection from the Department of Agriculture
(And from Their Own Employees)

Elliot Regenstein
A neon sign in the window of 7-Van Drugs reads "Food
Stamps," but the contradictory truth is posted inside on a handwrit
ten sign taped to a thick pane of bulletproof plastic.
7-Van Drugs sits at the intersection of Seven Mile Road and Van
Dyke in northern Detroit, where it has "serv[ed] the community
since 1948 at the same corner."1 Inside 7-Van is an array of staple
foods and basic household cleaning items, and there is a small phar
macy in the back. Customers must use a turnstile to pass their
purchases through the bulletproof plastic to the cashier. There are
no open windows, which could afford a clean shot. There is, how
ever, a small slot to pass money back and forth, and above it is
taped a pink piece of paper that says in black magic marker "We
don't accept food stamps."
The store was still part of the food stamp program when an un
dercover officer from the Michigan State Police walked in on De
cember 12, 1994.2 The officer was there to ensure that 7-Van was
not illegally trafficking in food stamps. He walked up to two cash
registers offering to sell food stamps for cash. Neither cashier took
the bait. The officer then left the store but was followed into the
parking lot by Saimir Jamel, a seventeen-year-old clerk who is the
nephew of the store's co-owners. Jamel, whose duties were limited
to sweeping the floor and parking lot and stocking the shelves, of
fered to buy the food stamps for cash. He bought $270 in food
stamps with $150 of his own money and gave the officer his pager
number. He went on to make two more illegal food stamp
purchases in January 1995, using his own money in both cases. Af
ter the third, the police arrested him in the parking lot outside of 7Van.
1. The author visited the store September 1, 1997 and May 17, 1998. Seven Mile Road is
flanked by a long low line of buildings and is one of the primary commercial thoroughfares in
northern Detroit. While a number of the buildings on Seven Mile Road are now abandoned,
7-Van Drugs currently shares a relatively modern plaza and a small parking lot with a mani
curist, an independent insurance agent, and a fashion accessories store.
2. The facts in this paragraph come from Bakal Bros. v. United States, 105 F.3d 1085, 1087
(6th Cir. 1997).

2156

June 1998]

Note - Food Stamp Trafficking

2157

After Jamel's arrest, the Department of Agriculture's Food and
Consumer Service (FCS)3 notified the owners of 7-Van that Jamel's
actions might result in the store's permanent disqualification from
the food stamp program.4 As part of that notification, the FCS told
the store's owners that if, within ten days, they provided all the in
formation necessary to request an agency hearing officially, the
FCS would consider fining the store instead of permanently dis
qualifying it.5 The store's owners did not, however, file a response
with the FCS within ten days, and the agency punished 7-Van with
permanent disqualification.6
Between 1982 and 1988, permanent disqualification was the
only punishment the FCS could administer to a store whose em
ployees illegally trafficked in food stamps.7 The FCS could use this
sanction on store owners who were entirely unaware of their em
ployees' illegal acts.8 In 1988, however, Congress amended the stat
ute and allowed the Department of Agriculture (USDA) to impose
a monetary sanction instead of permanent disqualification in some
innocent-owner9 cases.10
Although this change in the law granted the Department of Ag
riculture new discretion in deciding what sanction to impose, the
Department quickly displayed its reluctance to exercise it to benefit
innocent owners.11 Its new regulations created an arduous proce3. The Food and Consumer Service was formerly known as the Food and Nutrition Service. See Lopez v. United States, 962 F. Supp. 1225, 1227 (N.D. Cal. 1997).
4.

See Bakal Bros., 105 F.3d at 1087.
See Baka[ Bros., 105 F.3d at 1090 (citing 7 C.F.R. § 278.6(b)(2) (1994)).
6. See Bakal Bros., 105 F.3d at 1090.
7. See 7 U.S.C. § 2021(b) (1982); see also Kim v. United States, 121 F.3d 1269, 1272 (9th
5.

Cir. 1997).
8. See Ghattas v. United States, 40 F.3d 281, 283 (8th Cir. 1994) (describing the state of
the law prior to 1988). The F C S did not have complete freedom to apply this sanction, as the
Ninth Circuit refused to allow the F C S to punish store owners who did not know about their
employees' actions. See Kim, 121 F.3.d at 1272; Ghattas, 40 F.3d at 283.
9. This Note uses the term "innocent owner " to describe the proprietor of a small grocery
store whose employees have trafficked in food stamps illegally, and who did not know about
or benefit from the transaction. See 7 U. S.C. § 202l(b)(3)(B); see also Kim, 121 F.3d at 1274
("Congress believed that punishing innocent employers for the misdeeds of their employees
would create a powerful incentive for employers to guard against illegal . . . conduct. "); Bakal
Bros., 105 F.3d at 1090 (" Congress has made clear that innocent store owners should be held
responsible for the independent, unauthorized acts of store personnel."). To qualify as an
innocent owner, the proprietor must also have in place an "effective policy and program to
prevent violations. " See 7 U.S.C. § 2021(b)(3)(B) (1988).
10. See 7 U.S.C. § 2021(b)(3)(B). The amended statute allows "the Secretary . . . discretion to impose a civil monetary penalty of up to $20,000 in lieu of disqualification . . . . "
The circuits have unanimously found that the change in the statute eliminates the inno
cent-owner defense as a complete bar to liability. See Kim, 121 F.3d at 1273 (collecting
cases).
11. See Ghattas, 40 F.3d at 284 ("['The F C S's] regulations in many respects reflect a reluc
tant or hostile attitude toward the alternative monetary sanction. "). The Ghattas court's con
cern about the FC S's actions was based in part on the fact that Congress had expressed some
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<lure for groceries seeking to benefit from the USDA's discretion.
First, the regulations require stores to request a hearing on the civil
monetary penalty - and to submit all of the evidence supporting
their case -within ten days of receiving a charge letter.12 Second,
the evidence submitted may not include evidence about hardship to
households that might arise from the store's closure.13 Third, when
the civil monetary penalty is applied, the formula for assessing it
makes it likely that even small grocery stores will receive the maxi
mum penalty.14
Innocent owners have challenged these three provisions through
the Food Stamp Act's provision for de novo judicial review,15 and
store owners in St. Louis have met with some success. The Eighth
Circuit has found that the ten-day limit to request a hearing is arbi
trary and capricious,16 that the FCS cannot bar evidence about
hardship to households for stores that have committed trafficking
violations,17 and that the formula for determining the civil mone
tary penalty is also arbitrary and capricious.18 Outside of the
Eighth Circuit,· however, courts have found the ten-day require
ment to be either beyond the scope of judicial review19 or permissidispleasure with the FCS's administration of the program. See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 101-916,
at 1098 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5286, 5623 {"The Managers are concerned
with the manner in which the Secretary has implemented the retailer disqualification provi
sions of the Food Stamp Act."); see also Castillo v. United States, 989 F. Supp. 413, 419 (D.
Conn. 1997) {ruling on plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction) ("[T]he [Administrative
Review Officer] cites to 'internal USDA policy guidelines' for the proposition that trafficking
'shall warrant permanent disqualification, regardless of whether or not the firm benefited
from the violation, or the owner or management of the firm had knowledge of the violation.'
. . . This 'internal policy guideline' is in direct contravention of the Food Stamp Act
")
12. See 7 C.F.R. § 278.6{b){2){i), (iii) {1994).
• • . .

.

13. See 7 C.F.R. § 278.6(f){l). The regulations make a "hardship-to-households" defense
available only for offenses that would otherwise lead to a nonpermanent disqualification, but
not for offenses that would otherwise lead to a permanent disqualification. See 7 C.F.R.
§ 278.6{f){l). When it allows a hardship-to-households defense, the FCS considers whether
"the firm's disqualification would cause hardship to food stamp households because there is
no other authorized retail food store in the area selling as large a variety of staple food items
at comparable prices." 7 C.F.R. § 278.6{f){l).
14. The formula bases the penalty on the dollar amount of food stamps redeemed by the
violating store and dictates that the maximum penalty must be imposed if the trafficking
violation exceeds ninety-nine dollars and if the store redeems $40,000 or more in food stamps
annually. See 7 C.F.R. § 278.60). This formula effectively applies the maximum fine to al
most every store with a meaningful food stamp redemption program. See discussion infra
section III.B.
15. Parties aggrieved by FCS decisions are entitled to de novo review in United States
district courts or state courts, and the law directs judges to "determine the validity of the
questioned administrative action." 7 U.S.C. § 2023{a){l5) {Supp. II 1996).
16. See Ghattas, 40 F.3d at 285-86.
17. See Ghattas, 40 F.3d at 284-85.
18. See Corder v. United States, 107 F.3d 595, 598 {8th Cir. 1997).
19. See Goldstein v. United States, 9 F.3d 521, 524 {6th Cir. 1993); see also Bakal Bros. v.
United States, 105 F.3d 1085, 1090 (6th Cir. 1997).
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ble;20 they have approved the agency's formula for the civil
monetary penalty or found it to be beyond the scope of their re
view;21 and they have upheld the FCS's refusal to allow.evidence of
hardship to households.22
This Note argues that courts should adopt the Eighth Circuit's
approach in addressing the penalty procedures that follow food
stamp trafficking violations. Part I argues that the Food Stamp
Act's review provision allows for judicial review of the agency's
rules, and that the ten-day response requirement is an arbitrary and
capricious standard to which small store owners should not be held.
Part II contends that Congress intended to allow stores to present
evidence that their permanent disqualification would cause hard
ship to households - and that even absent that intent, the agency
has no basis for excluding it. Part III asserts that courts that refuse
to review the agency's formula for punishing violations misapply
Supreme Court doctrine, and that courts reviewing the formula will
find it cannot be upheld. This Note concludes that courts should
not allow the FCS to require stores to respond to charge letters
within ten days, that they should force the FCS to hear stores' evi
dence that their permanent disqualification would hurt the sur
rounding community, and that they should find the F CS's penalty
formula too harsh for small grocery stores.
I.

THE TEN-DAY RESPONSE REQUIREMENT

On March 1, 1995, the FCS notified the owners of 7-Van Drugs
that the agency was considei.-ing permanently disqualifying their
store from the food stamp program.23 The FCS rules allowed the
store's owners only ten days to request a civil monetary penalty in
lieu of the permanent disqualification; otherwise, they faced an au
tomatic permanent disqualification from the program.24 The store's
owners did not respond within ten days, and that, according to the
Sixth Circuit, required the FCS to disqualify the store perma
nently.25 Section I.A contends that courts can and should review
whether the FCS's ten-day response requirement is consistent with
Congress's intent in passing the Food Stamp Act. Section I.B fur
ther argues that when courts review the requirement they should
20.

See Lopez v. United States, 962 F. Supp. 1225, 1231 (N.D. Cal. 1997).

21. See Bakal Bros., 105 F.3d at 1090; Goldstein, 9 F.3d at 523. Several circuits have
refused to review the agency's sanctions since well before the 1988 amendments to the stat
ute. See, e.g., Kulkin v. Bergland, 626 F.2d 181. (1st Cir. 1980). One district court recently
found that the formula is not arbitrary and capricious. See Vasudeva v. United States, No.
C96-1252Z, 1998 WL 279223, at *4-7 (W.D. Wash. May 27, 1998).

See Kim v. United States, 121 F.3d 1269, 1275-76 (9th Cir. 1997).
See Bakal Bros., 105 F.3d at 1087.
24. See 7 C.F.R. § 278.6(b)(2)(ili) (1994).
25. See Bakal Bros., 105 F.3d at 1090.
22.

23.
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find it arbitrary and capricious because of the hardship it causes to
the owners of small grocery stores, who may not have the resources
necessary to prepare the immediate and thorough response that the
agency requires.
A.

The Legitimacy of Judicial Review

Judges should review the legitimacy of the FCS's ten-day re
sponse requirement because the Food Stamp Act requires review
ing courts to consider the validity of the FCS's rules.26 Courts
evaluating the validity of the ten-day response requirement should
determine whether the requirement is consistent with both the lan
guage of the Food Stamp Act and Congress's intent in passing the
Act.27
The Supreme Court requires courts evaluating the "validity" of
an agency's actions to consider whether the regulations conform to
the language and purpose of the statute.28 If Congress has ex
pressed a clear intent as to how an agency should act, the Court
requires the agency to act in that manner.29 Lower courts applying
this legal standard when considering the validity of a statute gener
ally have understood that a regulation's "validity" hinges on its
compliance with a statutory scheme.3° Courts should therefore
compare the FCS's ten-day response requirement to the statutory
scheme to see if the requirement is consistent with Congress's
intent.
The Sixth Circuit has not followed the Supreme Court's direc
tive.31 Instead of comparing the ten-day requirement to the statu
tory scheme to evaluate its validity, the Sixth Circuit has merely
ensured that the penalty imposed in each particular case is consis26. See 7 U. S.C. § 2023(a)(15) ( Supp. II 1996) ("[T]he court shall determine the validity
of the questioned administrative action in issue ... . ").
27. See Ghattas v.United States 40 F.3d 281, 285-87 (8th Cir. 1994) (discussing whether
regulations are consistent with Congress's intent).

28. See K-Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 291 (1988) ("In determining whether
a challenged regulation is valid a reviewing court must first determine if the regulation is
consistent with the language of the statute. . . . In ascertaining the plain meaning of the
statute, the court must look to the particular statutory language at issue, as well as the lan
guage and design of the statute as a whole. " (citations omitted)).
29. See K-Mart, 486 U.S. at 291 (discussing Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v.Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837 (1984)).
30. See RLC Indus. Co. v. Commissioner, 58 F.3d 413, 417 (9th Cir.1995) ("The question,
then, is whether (d)(5) is a valid regulation. . . . The inquiry thus becomes whether subsection
(d)(5) ...is consistent with Congress' mandate .. . . ");Illinois Envtl.Protection Agency v.
United States Envtl. Protection Agency, 947 F.
2d 283, 289 (7th Cir. 1991); Boettger v.
Bowen, 923 F.2d 1183, 1186 (6th Cir.1991) ("For the federal regulation and the state policy
to be valid, they must be consistent with the statutory purpose. To the extent they are incon
sistent 'vith the controlling statute, they are invalid. "); Clinton Meml.Hosp. v. Sullivan, 783
F. Supp. 1429, 1437 (D.D.C. 1992), affd., 10 F.3d 854 (D.C. Cir.1993).
31.

See Goldstein v. United States, 9 F.3d 521, 523-24 (6th Cir. 1993).
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tent with the agency's overall regulatory scheme.32 It refuses to
evaluate the regulation itself on the grounds that the Supreme
Court prohibits it from interfering in the "shaping" of agency sanc
tions.33 Because stores are foreclosed from a certain kind of sanc
tion if they fail to meet the deadline, the Sixth Circuit found that
the ten-day requirement affects the severity of the agency's sanc
tion, which it sees as shaping the sanction.34
The fundamental problem with this rationale is that the ten-day
response requirement is not a sanction. Black's Law Dictionary de
fines a sanction as a "penalty imposed."35 The ten-day response
requirement is a procedural requirement,36 not a penalty. The
agency itself makes this distinction - the ten-day requirement is
described in a subsection of the Code of Federal Regulations titled
"Charge letter,"37 while the agency's available range of sanctions is
discussed separately in a section titled "Penalties."38 Because the
requirement is procedural and is not a sanction, courts that com
pare the FCS's regulation to the statutory scheme need not show
deference to it as if it were a sanction. When courts compare the
32. See Goldstein, 9 F.3d at 523-24 ("[T]he question before us is whether the [F CS] acted
within its authority in permanently disqualifying Goldstein from the food stamp program....
7 CFR § 278.6(a) states that the [FCS] may impose the sanction of disqualification for a
violation of the statutes or regulations; such disqualification shall be permanent if the dis
qualification is based on trafficking. .. . The regulations thus authorize the [F CS] to prescribe
the sanction imposed in this case. ").
33. See Bakal Bros. v. United States, 105 F.3d 1085, 1088 (6th Cir. 1997); Goldstein, 9
F.3d at 523-24. The Sixth Circuit drew its reasoning from an Eighth Circuit Administrative
Procedure Act case. See Glover Livestock Commn. v. Hardin, 454 F.2d 109, 114 (8th Cir.
1972) ("The shaping of remedies is peculiarly within the special competence of the regulatory
agency vested by Congress with authority to deal with these matters ...."), revd. on other
grounds sub nom. Butz v. Glover Livestock Commn., 411 U.S. 182 (1973). See generally
American Power & Light Co.v.SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 112 (1946); Phelps Dodge Corp.v.NLRB,
313 U.S. 177, 194 (1941). The term "remedy " is used essentially as an analogous term to
"sanction"; see infra note 35.
While this section assumes that the Sixth Circuit is correct that courts should not review
the FCS's sanctions, section III.A argues that courts should evaluate those sanctions under
the Food Stamp Act's de novo review provision.
34. See Goldstein, 9 F.3d at 524 ("The regulations confer on the [FCS] discretion to miti
gate ...the sanction .. .. As the decision to mitigate relates to the severity of the sanction,
the [F CS's] denial of Goldstein's request for a civil money penalty in lieu of permanent dis
qualification [based on his missing the ten-day deadline] is precluded from our review ... .").
35. See BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 1341 (6th ed. 1990) (defining a sanction as a
"[p]enalty or other mechanism of enforcement used to provide incentives for obedience with
the law or with rules and regulations[; t]hat part of a law ... designed to secure enforcement
by imposing a penalty for its violation"); see also id. at 1294 (defining a remedy as "[t]he
means by which a right is enforced or the violation of a right is prevented, redressed, or
compensated ").
'
36. Cf. Walters v. National Assn. of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 329 (1985) ("The
[agency] procedures cited by the court do permit a claimant to prejudice his rights by failing
to respond in a timely manner to an agency notice . ... [T]hese procedural requirements have
[not] led to an unintended forfeiture . . . ." (emphasis added)).
37. 7 C.F.R. § 278.6(b) (1994).
38. 7 C.F.R.

§

278.6(e).
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ten-day response requirement to the statutory scheme, they are do
ing what the Food Stamp Act and the Supreme Court require of
them: they are assessing the validity of the agency's rules.39

B.

The Arbitrariness and Capriciousness of the Ten-Day
Requirement

Courts that assess the validity of the ten-day requirement must
determine whether the requirement is consistent with Congress's
intent and whether it is arbitrary and capricious.40 This section ar
gues that the FCS's ten-day requirement is contrary to Congress's
intent and arbitrary and capricious and should therefore be invali
dated. Section I.B.1 argues that the FCS's requirement is inconsis
tent with Congress's intent to allow stores access to secretarial
discretion. Section I.B.2 shows that the FCS failed to take into ac
count the impact of its regulations on small grocery stores and that
the regulations impose significant hardships on such stores. Section
I.B.3 demonstrates that the FCS has provided an inadequate justifi
cation for its rule.

1.

The Inconsistency of the FCS's Rule with Congress's Intent

The ten-day requirement is inconsistent with Congress's intent
to allow stores access to secretarial discretion. When Congress
modified the Food Stamp Act to allow the FCS discretion in the
penalty it administered, it intended to end the "one-strike-and-out"
rule then in effect:

The permanent disqualification of retail food stores upon the first
trafficking offense . . . seems excessively harsh. . .. [S]tores have been
permanently disqualified from participation in the food stamp pro
gram .. . for the sale of $6.00 in food stamps for $6.00 in cash. . ..
With Secretarial discretion, we can be assured that the punishment
will more closely fit the crime. 41
Discussion on the House floor made it clear that the Secretary's
discretion was essential to the administration of the new law.42 Be39. See 7 U.S. C. § 2023(a)(15) ( Supp. II 1996); K-Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S.
281, 291 (1988).
40. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. of the United States, v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
,
Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983).
41. H.R. REP. No. 100-828, at 27-28 (1988). Even without the explanation in the legisla
tive history, Congress's adding the secretarial discretion provisions to the statute is enough to
infer that Congress intended the Secretary to exercise discretion. See 7 U. S.C.
§ 202l(b)(3)(B) (1988).
42. When a technical correction to the amendment was made in October 1988, both of
the bill's primary advocates specifically noted the Secretary's newfound discretion. See 134
CoNG. REc. 32,269 (1988) (remarks of Rep. Panetta) ("The permanent disqualification . • •
without any evaluation of preventive measures . .. was excessively harsh. It is for this reason
that [the amendment] gives the Secretary of Agriculture the discretion to impose a fine
. • . ." ); id. at 32,269 (remarks of Rep. Emerson) ("The bill provides the Secretary of Agricul
ture . . . discretion . . . .").
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cause access to secretarial discretion is one of the amendment's ex
pressly stated purposes, courts assessing the validity of the FCS's
ten-day requirement must consider whether the regulation furthers
that goal.43 The requirement makes it difficult for stores, particu
larly small stores,44 to access secretarial discretion, putting the rule
squarely in conflict with Congress's intent and requiring courts to
invalidate it.45
2.

The Harsh Impact of the Ten-Day Requirement on Small
Grocery Stores

The ten-day response requirement is arbitrary and capricious
because the FCS has failed to consider the negative impact its regu
lation has on small groceries. The Supreme Court requires courts
to find agency rules arbitrary and capricious if the agency making
the rule failed to consider some important aspect of the matter the
rule addresses.46 Courts therefore must demand that the agency
consider all relevant factors of a problem and offer an explanation
for its decision.47 Furthermore, courts cannot provide an explana
tion for the agency if the agency did not provide one itself.48
The FCS has not offered evidence that it considered the impact
of the ten-day requirement on small grocery stores.49 In the ab
sence of direct evidence that the FCS considered the impact of its
rule on small businesses, courts reasonably can infer that the FCS
did not consider the negative impact its regulations would have on
43. See K-Mart, 486 U.S. at 291.
44.

See discussion infra Part I.B.2.

45. See K-Mart, 486 U.S. at 291 ("In determining whether a challenged regulation is valid,
a reviewing court must .. . determine if the regulation is consistent with the language of the
statute.").
46. See, e.g., Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 113 (1992) ("As we have often recog
nized, an agency ruling is 'arbitrary and capricious if the agency has .. . entirely failed to
consider an important aspect of the problem."' (citation omitted)).
47. See Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Assn. of the United States v. State Farm Mut.Auto. Ins. Co,
463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983).
48. See State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43 ("[W]e may not supply a reasoned basis for the
agency's action that the agency itself has not given." (citation omitted)).
49. When the FCS made the ten-day requirement part of an interim rule, it did not ex
plicitly say whether it had or had not considered the impact on small businesses in doing so.
See Food Stamp Program; Civil Money Penalties in Lieu of Permanent Disqualification for
Trafficking, 54 Fed. Reg. 18,641 (1989) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 278). The interim rule
was put in place in order to bring the regulations in line with the revised statute, which
became effective October 1, 1988. The FCS invited public co=ent before the final
rulemaking. See id. at 18,642.
The FCS has not only failed to give a clear explanation of its actions in the Federal Regis
ter, but also apparently has failed to give a clear explanation when the regulation has been
challenged in court. One district court, in upholding the regulation as not arbitrary and ca
pricious, did not discuss in any detail what the agency actually considered when formulating
the regulation; instead, it discussed what inferences can be made from the FCS's regulatory
scheme. See Lopez v.United States, 962 F. Supp. 1225, 1231 (N.D. Cal. 1997).
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small groceries, because it would be difficult - if not impossible for most small grocery stores to meet the FCS's uncompromising
requirements in only ten days.so
The FCS's requirements are harsh: the agency requires stores to
provide every piece of documentation relating to the store's train
ing program for new employees within ten days; otherwise the
agency will permanently disqualify the store from the program .st
Many proprietors of small businesses may not understand that they
need to provide the necessary documentation, let alone organize it
within ten days. In one case, a store owner whose employee had
committed a trafficking violation sent a detailed letter begging the
FCS for forgiveness, but failed to include the documentation of the
store's compliance program.52 When the store owner later found
out that the FCS required the documentation, she sent it, but the
50. See Ghattas v. United States, 40 F.3d 281, 285-86 (8th Cir. 1994), quoted infra in text
accompanying note 59. The Lopez court vigorously disagreed with Ghattas's attack on the
ten-day requirement, saying:
While it might be convenient for an owner busy running a store to have more than ten
days, there is nothing in the nature of drafting or copying such documents that makes a
ten day limit inherently unreasonable, nor therefore the imposition of that limit "a clear
error of judgment." If the regulation allowed only one day, presuming that all the re
quired documentation would be extant and available for immediate mailing, then one
could conclude that the agency had "entirely failed to consider an important aspect of
the problem."

Lopez, 962 F. Supp. at 1231 (citation omitted). By admitting that one day is not enough, the
Lopez court engages in the same exercise as the Ghattas court: considering how many days
in which a store could reasonably be expected to respond to an FCS notice. Careful consid
eration would require evidence of the business circumstances of small grocery stores, to see if
they could reasonably be expected to meet a ten-day deadline. While the Lopez opinion
cites portions of the Ghattas opinion explaining the hardship the requirement causes to own
ers of small groceries, the Lopez court apparently was not convinced that a small grocery
store would need more than ten days to find an attorney who could then organize the exten
sive documentation required by the FCS.
51. See 7 C.F.R. § 278.6(b)(2)(iii) (1994) ("If a firm fails to request consideration for a
civil money penalty in lieu of a permanent disqualification for trafficking and submit docu
mentation and evidence of its eligibility within the 10 days specified in § 278.6(b)(1), the firm
shall not be eligible for such a penalty."); see also Lopez, 962 F. Supp. at 1228 ("[I]n order to
be considered for the money penalty, [the store's owner] had to enclose copies of all docu
mentation demonstrating the violation prevention policy in use at [the] store.").
52. See Lopez, 962 F. Supp. at 1227-28. In Lopez, clerk Alonzo Lopez, the son of the
owners of the Chavez Meat Market in Newark, California, sold an investigator ineligible
items, and another clerk purchased food stamps for cash. See Lopez, 962 F. Supp. at 1227.
In response to the allegations, Guadalupe Lopez, Alonzo's mother, wrote to the FCS
admitting the store's guilt eight days after receiving the charge. She admitted that their son
had not been properly trained before working at the store while on a break from school.
( Any store that requests a civil monetary penalty must have an adequate training program
for its employees to be considered, see 7 U.S.C. § 2021(b)(3)(B) (Supp. II 1996), but the FCS
apparently did not reach the issue of the store's training program). The owners said that they
had explained the rules to their employees again, and were translating them into Spanish to
ensure that all of them understood; they did not, however, provide any documentary evi
dence of these programs. The letter closed with Ms. Lopez begging for forgiveness, and
asking if the case could be re-evaluated. See Lopez, 962 F. Supp. at 1227-28.
The FCS did not consider Ms. Lopez's letter a timely request for a civil monetary penalty.
See Lopez, 962 F. Supp. at 1228.
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FCS refused to hear her appeal because she had missed the dead
line.s3 If the FCS showed more sympathy to ownerss4 and allowed
some flexibility in the ten-day limit for owners making a good-faith
effort to comply with the FCS's investigation,55 the FCS's rule
would be more reasonable and less capricious.
Furthermore, ten days is too short a time for the owner of a
small grocery store to find counsel to help in these matters.56 In
other adversarial proceedings, parties are given more time to gather
less material than innocent owners are expected to gather to re
quest an FCS hearing.57 Having counsel certainly could give the
store a better chance in the difficult FCS administrative review pro
cess.58 While an attorney presumably could organize the documen
tation in the time required, as the Eighth Circuit found, the rule
53. After sending the documentation, Lopez brought the FCS to court. The court
granted the FCS summary judgment against her on the procedural ground, without ever
reaching the merits of the case. See Lopez, 962 F.Supp.at 1231-32.
54. Some agencies, when imposing response requirements on themselves, allow them
selves waivers in "unusual" circumstances, and the FCS could allow waivers for stores in
certain circumstances. See, e.g., 15 C.F.R. § 4b.5 (1997) ("If a response [to a request for
information] cannot be made within ten days due to unusual circumstances ... the [Com
merce Department officer] shall send an acknowledgment ...providing information on the
status of the request ... .").
55. Cf. Ghattas, 40 F.3d at 286 ("[The FCS's] unreasonable ten-day time limit would not
be of great concern if the innocent store owner retained a later opportunity to urge the
agency's ultimate decision-maker to impose a lesser monetary sanction."). If a store cannot
produce the necessary material even after an extension, then a permanent disqualification
would be appropriate. See !bay, Inc.v.United States.No. 97-1558, 1997 WL 741365, at *1
(4th Cir.Dec. 2, 1997) (per curiam) (unpublished) ("Although given a lengthy extension,
!bay failed to provide any documentation at the administrative level ....").
56.

See Ghattas, 40 F.3d at 285-86.

57. Many agencies that require responses to charge letters allow longer than ten days.
See, e.g., Procedures for Implementation of the Fastener Quality Act, 15 C. F.R. §§ 280.1,
.605, .608 (1997) ("The Fastener Quality Act ...protect[s] the public safety [by requiring]
that certain fasteners ...conform to the specifications to which they are represented to be
manufactured .... The Director . . .may begin administrative enforcement proceedings . ..
by issuing a charging letter.... The respondent must answer the charging letter within 30
days .. . .").
The Eighth Circuit also noted that the ten-day requirement is "far shorter than the time
for filing a one-paragraph notice of appeal to this court." See Ghattas, 40 F.3d at 285.
58. In fiscal year 1994, 1452 food stamp cases were processed through the Department of
Agriculture's administrative review process. See Fooo & CONSUMER SERV., U.S.DEPT.OF
Aaruc., RETAILER ACTIVITY REPORT: F1scAL YEAR 1994 19, 61 (1996) [hereinafter RE
TAILER ACTIVITY REPORT]. Of those, 168 (12%) were reversed, 54 (4%) were reduced, and
1230 (85%) were sustained. See id.
Courts reviewing the results of these administrative determinations generally have been
more sympathetic than the FCS. For comparison, in fiscal year 1994, 83.5% of administrative
review cases led to disqualification, including 53% that led to permanent disqualification,
while 8.2% led to a civil monetary penalty in lieu of disqualification. See id. at 20. Of the
cases that reached judicial review, 50% led to a disqualification, including 28.6% that led to
permanent disqualification, while 24.5% led to a civil monetary penalty in lieu of disqualifica
tion. See id. The FCS's administrative review officers dismissed only 2.3% of the prosecu
tions before them, while courts dismissed 16.3%. See id.
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disadvantages smaller stores that may have limited access to
counsel:

Perhaps the general counsel of a supermarket chain could comply
with this command . . . . We have little doubt that most sole proprie
tors of small grocery stores would find it virtually impossible to locate
and hire an attorney who could master this area of the law and gather
and file the necessary materials in ten days. Once again, the [FCS]
regulations dramatically skew the administrative process to the disad
vantage of small business.59
For the most part, the businesses that have proceeded against the
FCS pro se have been unsuccessful.60 The FCS's rule dispropor
tionately harms small businesses, suggesting that the agency did not
consider its impact when promulgating the regulation and making
the regulation arbitrary and capricious.

3.

The FCS's Inability to Justify Its Requirement

When forced to defend its regulations in court, the FCS has
failed to offer direct evidence in support of its regulations. Instead,
it has relied on analogies, and the analogies it has used are inappro
priate. While the FCS correctly claims that some other agencies do
require responses to charge letters within ten days,61 those other
agencies may do so in order to comply with statutorily imposed
deadlines. In those situations, allowing more than ten days for a
response would compromise the agencies' ability to fulfill their stat59. Ghattas, 40 F.3d at 285-86. Oddly enough, the Eighth Circuit's next major food stamp
case did involve a pro se litigant, but one who had managed to make a timely request for a
civil monetary penalty. See Corder v. United States, 107 F.3d 595, 596 (8th Cir. 1996).
60. See Brooks v. United States, 64 F.3d 251 (7th Cir. 1995) (per curiam) {finding against
the owner of a small store who made a pro se challenge of FCS disqualification); Haskell v.
United States Dept. of Agric., 930 F.2d 816 (10th Cir. 1991) (same); Woodard v. United
States, 725 F.2d 1072 (6th Cir. 1984) (same); Hernandez v. United States Dept. of Agric.
Food & Consumer Serv., 961 F. Supp. 483 (W.D.N.Y. 1997) (finding against the owner of a
small store who made a pro se challenge of FCS withdrawal of authorization); Calderon v.
United States Dept. of Agric. Food & Nutrition Serv., 756 F. Supp. 181 (D.N.J. 1990) (dis
missing case because of inadequacy of pleadings filed pro se, and plaintiff later retained coun
sel to no avail); Reason v. Heslin, 723 F. Supp. 1309 ( S.D. Ind. 1989) (same); Wilson v.
United States, 651 F. Supp. 701 (E.D. Wis. 1986) (finding against the owner of a small store
who made a pro se challenge of F C S disqualification); cf. Moon v. United States, Nos. 951797, 95-2364, 1996 WL 342005, at *4 (4th Cir. June 21, 1996) (per curiam) (unpublished)
(finding against plaintiffs because of attorney error); Mused v. United States Dept. of Agric.,
Food & Nutrition Serv., 169 F. R.D. 28 (W.D.N.Y. 1996) (dismissing a case brought by a small
store that hired a sole practitioner who missed a court deadline). But see Corder, 107 F.3d at
596 (finding for pro se challenger of F C S sanction); Harrison v. United States Dept. of
Agric., 915 F. Supp. 115 (E.D. Mo. 1995) (finding for the owner of a small store who chal·
lenged FCS's refusal to allow the store to participate in program).
61. See Food Stamp Program; Civil Money Penalties in Lieu of Permanent Disqualifica
tion for Trafficking, 55 Fed. Reg. 31,809, 31,812 (1990) (to be codified at 7 C.F. R. pt. 278)
("[T]his 10-day timeframe is consistent with other regulatory requirements . . . •").
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utorily imposed duties.62 The FCS has no similar statutory require
ment to justify its position, making its analogy inadequate.63
Assuming arguendo that the FCS did take into account the im
pact on small businesses, the regulations only seem more in conflict
with Congress's intent. In this scenario, the FCS would seem to
want to harm small businesses, which are less able to meet a strict
requirement than large supermarkets.64 By creating this obstacle,
the requirement institutes a de facto one-strike-and-out policy for
small groceries. That, however, would create an explicit conflict
with Congress's intent to end the one-strike-and-out practice that
automatically disqualifies groceries after one trafficking offense by
a store's employees.6s
There are legitimate policy reasons underlying the FCS's reluc
tance to make it easier for the owners of small grocery stores to
request a hearing to appeal their disqualifications. Small grocery
stores have been hotbeds of corruption in the food stamp pro
gram,66 particularly in poor neighborhoods.67 Most of the stores
participating in the food stamp program are small and indepen
dently owned; while supermarkets redeem 77% of all food stamps,
62. See, e.g., New Drug and Antibiotic Regulations, 50 Fed. Reg. 7452, 7485 (1985)
("[T]he primary purpose in [imposing a ten-day response requirement] was to _provide for
agency action within the 180-day time frame specified by the act.").
63. See Civil Money Penalties in Lieu of Permanent Disqualification for Trafficking, 55
Fed. Reg. at 31,812.
The Department also justifies its narrow window by saying that it is "simply requesting
copies of policies and documentation of compliance program activities already in existence. "
See id. The fact that the FCS requires small stores to keep extensive written records has also
come under criticism, and the FCS has responded that the standards are the same for both
small and large stores. See id. at 31,810. While stores are required to keep these records on
an ongoing basis, they may not understand how to use the information in a response to an
FCS charge letter. See Kim v. United States, 121 F.3d 1269, 1271 (9th Cir. 1997); Ghattas, 40
F.3d at 285-86; Lopez v. United States, 962 F. Supp. 1225, 1227-28 (N.D. Cal. 1997). See also
discussion supra Section I.B.
64. See Ghattas, 40 F.3d at 286 ("[T]he [FCS] regulations dramatically skew the adminis
trative process to the disadvantage of small business. "); see also discussion supra Part I.B.1.
65. See supra text accompanying note 41.
66. See Fooo & CONSUMER SERV., U.S. DEPT. OF AGruc., THE EXTENT OF T RAFFICKING
Fooo STAMP PROGRAM 4 (1995) [hereinafter THE EXTENT OF T RAFFICKING] (noting
that only 4.2% of supermarkets are involved in trafficking, while 12.8% of small grocery
stores are involved in trafficking); see also Changes in Food Stamps: U.S. Officials Consider
Limitations on Stores, ST. Loms PoST-DISPATCH, Jan. 6, 1995, at 12A ("Agriculture Depart
ment officials believe the USDA can curb black-market trafficking in food stamps by drop
ping from the program some of the small, independently owned groceries where fraud tends
to occur."); Jennifer Dixon, Fraud in Food Stamps Thrives, Inquiry Finds, ST. Louis PoST
D1sPATCH, Sept. 2, 1995, at 13B ("1he black market for food stamps is thriving largely be
cause federal regulators have authorized scores of questionable businesses to accept food
stamps . . . . "); John R. Emshwiller, Hot Special at Small Stores: Food-Stamp Fraud, WALL
ST. J., June 1, 1995, at Bl ("[S]mall businesses play a surprisingly big role in food-stamp
fraud.").
.
IN THE

67. See THE EXTENT OF T RAFFICKING, supra note 66, at 7 (showing that in areas where 0
to 10% of households are in poverty, 4.6% of stores are involved in trafficking, while in areas
where over 30% of households are in poverty, 19.2% of stores are involved in trafficking).
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they compose only 15% of the stores enrolled in the program.6s
Fraud is far more common in smaller stores,69 and that will become
increasingly true as larger stores install electronic transfer systems
that make trafficking more difficult.70 Small stores are on the front
lines in the Department of Agriculture's crackdown on food stamp
fraud, which often involves the exchange of food stamps for cash or
contraband.n
Despite the role of small stores in food stamp trafficking, the
FCS cannot justify its ten-day requirement, because it does not con
form with the Food Stamp Act's statutory scheme. When Congress
amended the statute it was aware that trafficking was a problem,
but it still demanded that store owners be given access to secretarial
discretion.72 Congress provided for secretarial discretion because
some store's manager' fight corruption and Congress felt that those
owners should not receive the same punishment as owners who
made no effort�73 The FCS should therefore protect innocent own
ers' ability to defend themselves. Owners who are in fact guilty will
still face permanent disqualification after the hearing. For that rea
son, making it easier for store owners to receive a hearing would
not necessarily allow corrupt owners to stay in the program.74
Courts should not allow the FCS to enforce its ten-day response
requirement strictly. The rule denies small stores access to the pro68. H.R. REP. No.104-77, at 48 {1995); RETAILER ACTIVITY REPORT, supra note 58, at 9.
69. See Emshwiller, supra note 66, at Bl ("'Most retailer trafficking occurs in smaller
stores,' Roger C. Viadero, the Agriculture Department's inspector general, recently testified
before Congress."); see also H.R.REP. No.104-77, at 48 ("U SD A has found that most retail
trafficking occurs in smaller food stores .. . .").
70. Electronic transfer systems make food stamp fraud easier to detect than the paper
stamps that had been used exclusively until recently. See Merrell Foote, Texas Saying Good
bye to Paper Food Stamps; Debit Card System Designed to Reduce Fraud, WASH. PosT, Sept.
10, 1995, at A20. Smaller stores may be reluctant, however, to spend the money necessary to
install these systems. See Mark Hornbeck, Food Stamps: State Plans Test From Coupons to
Debit Card System, DETROIT NEws, Apr.4, 1997, at Cl.
71. The Secret Service has found that food stamps are frequently sold to small stores for
cash that then is used to buy drugs, often right in the store in which the food stamps were
illegally sold. See Probe ofFood Stamp Fraud Targets Grocers, L.A.TIMES, Sept.10, 1994, at
9; see also H.R.REP. No.104-77, at 47 ("In many communities, food stamps have become a
second currency... . [F]ood stamps [are] traded for cash, drugs, [and] guns ... . ").
72. See H.R.REP. No. 100-828, at 27 {"Sale of food stamps at a discount price or trading
food stamps for non-food items is a serious offense. It violates the purpose of the food stamp
program and harms needy food stamp families.... [Nevertheless t]he permanent disqualifi
cation of retail food stores upon the first trafficking offense - without any evaluation of
preventive measures or complicity in the trafficking - seems excessively harsh.").
73. See H.R. REP. No. 100-828, at 27-28 ("[T]here are instances in which trafficking in
food stamps will take place - despite the best efforts of all people committed to a well-run
food stamp program. . . .Under current law no discretion is provided to the Secretary of
Agriculture to evaluate a store's actions to prevent . . .violations. This provision provides
this discretion.").
74. See 7 U.S.C.§ 2021 (b)(3){B) (Supp.II 1996) (explaining that the penalty for inno
cent-owner trafficking violations is permanent disqualification unless the Secretary finds suf
ficient evidence to reduce the penalty).
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tection Congress intended for them to have, and does not even as
sist the FCS in its efforts to root out illegal food stamp trafficking.
The requirement has no good justification, and courts should there
fore prevent the agency from applying it.
II.

EVIDENCE OF lMPACT ON

THE

COMMUNITY

Even if 7-Van Drugs had made a timely request for a hearing on
whether to impose a civil monetary sanction instead of permanent
disqualification, the store would not have been allowed to present
evidence at that hearing of the detrimental effect that losing its food
stamp privileges would have on the surrounding community. In
some food stamp trafficking cases, the FCS allows stores to present
hardship-to-households evidence, but not in permanent disqualifi
cation cases.75
In evaluating the agency's regulation that prevents innocent
owners from presenting hardship-to-households evidence,76 courts
should consider whether the agency's rule is consistent with Con
gress's intent by applying the two-step Chevron test.77 Under Chev
ron, the court must first decide if Congress had an unambiguous
intent that hardship-to-households evidence be either included or
excluded.78 If Congress's intent is unambiguous, the court must
force the FCS to comply with Congress's intent.79 If, however,
Congress's intent is ambiguous, the court must then decide whether
the agency's regulation is a reasonable construction of the statute. 80
Section II.A shows that Congress unambiguously intended to re
quire the FCS to permit hardship-to-households evidence in inno
cent-owner cases. Section II.B argues that even if Congress's intent
75. The F C S sometimes mitigates penalties because "the firm subject to a disqualification
is selling a substantial variety of staple food items, and the firm's disqualification would cause
hardship to food stamp households because there is no other authorized retail food store in
the area selling as large a variety of staple food items at comparable prices. " See 7 C.F.R.
§ 278.6(f)(l) (1994). Such evidence is not allowed, however, in cases in which the firm is
facing a permanent disqualification, such as in innocent-owner cases. See 7 C.F.R. § 278.6(i).
This section criticizes that distinction as contrary to Congress's intent and as arbitrary and
capricious.
In the particular case of 7-Van Drugs, it is possible the store's hardship-to-households
evidence might not have been compelling because of the presence of competitors within
walking distance.
76. All innocent-owner cases fall under the F C S's exception, because permanent disquali
fication is a potential penalty. See 7 U.S.C. § 202l(b)(3)(B).
77. Chevron U.S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
The two courts that have addressed this particular issue have both done so within a Chevron
framework. See Kim v. United States 121 F.3d 1269, 1275 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing Chevron);
Ghattas v. United States, 40 F.3d 281, 284-85 (8th Cir. 1994) (citing Smithville R-II Sch. Dist.
v. Riley, 28 F.3d 55, 57-58 (8th Cir. 1994), which relied on Chevron).
78.

See Chevron, 467 U. S. at 843.
See Chevron, 467 U. S. at 842-43 & n.9.
80. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.

79.
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had been ambiguous, the FCS's exclusion of hardship-to-house
holds evidence in these cases is not a reasonable construction of the
statute.
A.

Congress's Clear Intent to Allow Innocent Owners to Present
Hardship-to-Households Evidence

This section argues that Congress, when amending the Food
Stamp Act, intended to compel the FCS to consider evidence of
hardship to food stamp households in innocent-owner cases. Sec
tion II.A.1 demonstrates that the plain language of the statute sup
ports this conclusion. Section II.A.2 shows how this interpretation
is consistent with the legislative history of the Food Stamp Act
amendments.
1.

The Plain Language of the Statute

The Food Stamp Act directs the FCS to consider evidence of
hardship to households when deciding whether to disqualify viola
tors of the act or to assess them a monetary penalty. The language
mandating the consideration of hardship-to-households evidence
appears in the statute's introductory paragraph subsection (a) ("the
introduction"). It provides, in relevant part:
(A) DISQUALIFICATION OR CIVIL PENALTY[:] Any approved retail

food store . . . may be disqualified for a specified period of time . . . or
subjected to a civil money penalty of up to $10,000 for each violation
if the Secretary determines that its disqualification would cause hard
ship to food stamp households . . . .81

All of the penalty provisions for specific offenses, detailed im
mediately following the introduction in subsection (b) (the "specific
penalty clauses"), incorporate by reference the language of this
introduction:
(B) PERIOD OF DISQUALIFICATION [:] Disqualification under subsec
tion (a) of this section shall be . . .

(3) permanent upon . . .
(B) the first occasion or any subsequent occasion of a disqualification
based on the purchase of coupons or trafficking in coupons . . . by a
retail food store . . . except that the Secretary shall have the discretion
to impose a civil money penalty of up to $20,000 for each violation . . .
in lieu of disqualification . . . if the Secretary �etermines that there is
substantial evidence that such store . . . had an effective policy and
program in effect to prevent violations of the chapter and regulations
82

The language "Disqualification under subsection (a) of this sec
tion" at the beginning of subsection (b) makes it clear that each
81.
82.

7 U.S.C.§
7 u.s.c.

202l{a).

§ 2021(b).
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subparagraph in section (b) should include the language of the in
troduction. This incorporation by reference therefore requires the
Secretary to consider a hardship-to-households defense for disqual
ifi.cations under subparagraph (b) (3) (B) (the innocent-owner pen
alty clause).83 Had Congress included the hardship-to-households
language in the body of the innocent-owner penalty clause, it would
have been repetitive.84
The FCS's present rule makes sense only if the innocent-owner
penalty clause does not incorporate the hardship-to-households de
fense by reference. The FCS claims that the different maximum
civil monetary penalty in the innocent-owner penalty clause85
makes that clause "mutually exclusive" of the introduction, so the
hardship-to-households defense in the introduction does not apply
to cases decided under the innocent-owner penalty clause.86 The
Supreme Court has held that if one section of a statute includes
particular language, and another section of the same statute does
not, it should be presumed that Congress intentionally excluded the
language in the section that does not include it.87
Where specifi.c language of the innocent-owner penalty clause
disagrees with the introduction, the specifi.c language must trump
the general. But the innocent-owner penalty clause's incorporation
of the introduction is not destroyed. Here, the difference in the
maximum penalties does not matter, because the remainder of the
introduction's language is still incorporated by reference into the
specifi.c penalty clauses,88 and the innocent-owner penalty clause
describes a specifi.c subset of the violations described broadly in the
introduction.89 Because the specifi.c language controls the gen83. See 7 U.S.C. § 2021(b), (b)(3), (b)(3)(B).
84. The legislative history does not speak directly to why Congress did not include the
provision in the innocent-owner penalty clause, so it is impossible to know definitively why it
was not put in. See H.R. REP. No. 100-828.
85. Compare 7 U.S.C. § 2021(a) (the introduction) (setting a maximum civil monetary
penalty of $10,000 for any violations of the Food Stamp Act) with 7 U.S.C. § 2021(b)(3)(B)
(the specific penalty clause) (setting a maximum civil monetary penalty of $20,000 for any
trafficking violations).
86. See Kim v. United States, 121 F.3d 1269, 1275-76 (9th Cir. 1997).
87. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 432 (1987); see also Kim, 121 F.3d at 1276
("'[W]here Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in
another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and
purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion."' (quoting Tang v. Reno, 77 F.3d 1194, 1197
(9th Cir. 1996), which quotes Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 432)).
88. See 7 U.S.C. § 2021(b); supra text accompanying note 82.
89. Compare 7 U.S.C. § 2021(a) ("[Frrms may be] subjected to a civil monetary penalty of
up to $10,000 for each violation . . . [of] . . . any of the provisions of this chapter or the
regulations issued pursuant to this chapter.") with 7 U.S.C. § 2021(b)(3)(B) ("a civil mone
tary penalty of up to $20,000 for each violation . . . for such purchase ofcoupons or trafficking
in coupons or cards that constitutes a violation of the provisions of this chapter or the regula
tions issued pursuant to this chapter" (emphasis added)).
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eral,90 the higher limit of the innocent-owner penalty clause trumps
the limit of the introduction.91 It is not proper, however, to infer
that the difference in penalty limits makes the incorporation by ref
erence invalid - a leap necessary to support the FCS's position,92
Furthermore, the FCS's regulation is inconsistent with the plain
language of the statute because it distinguishes between types of
offending stores in ways that the statute itself does not. The Food
Stamp Act discusses instances when a hardship-to-households de
fense will make a civil monetary penalty available in lieu of disqual
ifi.cation, and the Act never says that the civil penalty will be
available only if the store's disqualifi.cation would have been tem
porary and not permanent.93 The FCS, however, allows evidence of
hardship to households only when the store's maximum penalty is a
temporary disqualifi.cation.94 Because this FCS regulation is incon
sistent with the plain meaning of the statute, courts "must give ef
fect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress"95 and find
the agency's regulation unlawful. The FCS's distinction "deprives
food stamp beneficiaries of a statutory exception enacted for their
benefit. "96
90. See, e.g., Gozlon-Peretz v. United States, 498 U.S. 395, 407 (1991); Bulova Watch Co.
v. United States, 365 U.S. 753, 758 (1961) ("[I]t is familiar law that a specific statute controls
over a general one . . . .").
91. See Kim, 121 F.3d at 1275 (citing Security Pac. Natl. Bank v. RTC, 63 F.3d 900, 904
(9th Cir. 1995)). While the Ninth Circuit cites one of its own cases to support this proposi
tion, the idea that a specific statute controls over a general statute is well settled in American
law. See Bulova Watch Co., 365 U.S. at 758.
92. The Ninth Circuit made this leap, but made it without the support of any other court.
See Kim, 121 F.3d at 1275 ("Moreover, the difference in the monetary limits suggests the
provisions are mutually exclusive." (no citation provided in text)).
93. See 7 U.S.C. § 2021(a) ("Any approved retail food store . . . may be disqualified for a
specified period of time from further participation in the food stamp program, or subjected to
a civil money penalty of up to $10,000 for each violation if the Secretary determines that its
disqualification would cause hardship to food stamp households . . . ."). The term "specified
period of time" includes permanently. Outside the trafficking context, where permanent dis
qualification can be imposed for a firm's first violation, the FCS has used its authority under
this paragraph to disqualify repeat offenders permanently. See 7 C.F.R. § 278.6(a) (1994)
("[FCS] may disqualify any authorized retail food store . . . if the firm fails to comply with the
Food Stamp Act . . . . [D]isqualification shall be permanent for a firm's third sanction . . . . ");
see also Castillo v. United States, 989 F. Supp. 413, 419 (D. Conn. 1997) (ruling on plaintiffs
motion for preliminary injunction) ("[T]he statute does not limit the 'hardship to households'
exception to non-permanent disqualification, but rather provides generally that any disquali
fication may be replaced by a money penalty.").
94. See 7 C.F.R. § 278.6(f)(l) ("A civil money penalty for hardship to food stamp house
holds may not be imposed in lieu of a permanent disqualification." (emphasis added)).
95. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
843 (1984).
96. Ghattas v. United States, 40 F.3d 281, 285 (8th Cir. 1994); Castillo, 989 F. Supp. at 419
(quoting Ghattas) . The Ninth Circuit has found that Congress did not speak directly to the
issue of this distinction. See Kim, 121 F.3d at 1275.
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The Legislative Purpose

The FCS's refusal to hear hardship-to-household defenses in in
nocent-owner cases is also inconsistent with Congress's intent in
passing the Food Stamp Act and its amendments. Congress passed
the Food Stamp Act with the stated intention of providing healthy
food to people who might not otherwise be able to afford it.97 The
Supreme Court found in United States Department of Agriculture v.
Moreno that providing low-income households with healthier foods
is the primary purpose of the Act.98 "While the Act's language has
changed over the years, this fundamental purpose remains un
changed.99 The FCS's refusal to hear hardship-to-households evi
dence in innocent-owner cases is inconsistent with Congress's
purpose to provide healthier food for poorer families.100 Adminis
trative disregard for hard-hit households punishes the intended
beneficiaries of the Act, rather than protecting them.
The 1988 amendments to the Food Stamp Act made substantial
changes to the penalties imposed on innocent owners, but the
amendments' legislative history makes no mention of whether a
hardship-to-households defense should be denied to innocent own
ers.101 The legislative history focuses solely on narrow, technical
changes made in subsection (b)102 and does not address the part of
the statute that remained the same: the incorporation by reference
97. See Food Stamp Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-525, § 2, 78 Stat. 703 (codified as
amended at 7 U.S.C. § 2011) ("It is hereby declared to be the policy of Congress, in order to
promote the general welfare, that the Nation's abundance of food should be utilized coopera
tively . . . to the maximum extent practicable to safeguard the health and well-being of the
Nation's population and raise levels of nutrition among low-income households.").
98. 413 U.S. 528, 533-34 (1973). In Moreno the Court was evaluating the constitutionality
of an amendment to the Food Stamp Act requiring all members of a food stamp household to
be blood relatives. The Court reiterated its holding 15 years later in Lyng v. International
Union, 485 U.S. 360, 371 (1988) ("[T]he Act was passed to alleviate hunger and malnutrition
and to strengthen the agricultural economy.").
99. See Dan Glickman, Letter to the Editor, Food Stamp Fraud: No Joke, WASH. PosT,
Dec. 9, 1995, at A23 ("[W]e . . . ensure that the food stamp program will accomplish its health
mission: getting food to people who need it."); John L. Mitchell, 683 Stores Barred From U.S.
Food Stamp Program, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 17, 1995, at Bl ("'[W]holesome, nutritious, afforda
ble food [is what] the food stamp program is meant to provide,' [Agriculture Secretary Dan
Glickman] said [in 1995].").
100. Cf. Rodway v. United States Dept. of Agric., 514 F.2d 809, 823 (D.C. Cir. 1975)
{"The purposes of the Food Stamp Act - the health and well-being of our populace - are
too important, and the legislative intent that those purposes be achieved for substantially all
recipients too clear, for us to allow their administrative evisceration."). For an explanation of
the hardship caused to food stamp households, see discussion infra Part Il.B.2.
101. See H.R. REP. No. 100-828, at 27-28. It does emphasize that the antitrafficking pro
visions must serve the statute's purpose of assisting families in need. See H.R. REP. No. 100828, supra.
102. See id. (discussing the kinds of policies and programs that would allow the Depart
ment of Agriculture to conclude that a store's management had trained employees to know
which food stamp transactions were legal and which were illegal, and to further conclude that
management had actively discouraged employees from participating in illegal transactions).
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of the hardship-to-households defense in subsection (a) to subsec
tion (b).103 That the incorporation by reference remained un
changed in the amended statute suggests that Congress expected it
to remain in force.104
Courts should find that the FCS is required to consider hard
ship-to-households evidence, based on the plain language of the
statute and Congress's legislative intent. They should find that the
FCS was mistaken when it severed the innocent-owner penalty
clause from the introduction and drew distinctions between stores
in a way Congress did not authorize. They should also find that the
agency's action is inconsistent with Congress's policy of providing
quality food to impoverished households and its expectation that
hardship-to-households evidence will be available to innocent own
ers defending themselves. If, however, a court finds that Congress's
intent on this matter was ambiguous, it must proceed to consider
whether the agency's rule is arbitrary and capricious under the sec
ond step of Chevron. 1os
B.

The FCS's Decision to Exclude Hardship-to-Households
Evidence Is Arbitrary and Capricious Under the Second
Step of Chevron

This section argues that even if Congress's intent in the statu
tory scheme were ambiguous, the FCS's exclusion of hardship-to
households evidence should be found arbitrary and capricious
under the second step of the Chevron test.106 Section II.B.1 finds
that the FCS failed to explain this exclusion, making it difficult for a
court to sustain the FCS's regulation. Section II.B.2 argues that the
FCS could not reasonably decide to exclude hardship-to-house
holds evidence.
1.

The FCS's Failure to Explain Its Actions

The FCS's decision to exclude hardship-to-households evidence
is arbitrary and capricious because the FCS has failed to explain the
103. Compare 7 U.S.C. § 2021 {1988) with 7 U.S.C. § 2021 (1982) (incorporation by refer
ence remains identical); see H.R. REP. No. 100-828 (no discussion of that fact).
104. See Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 567 (1988) ("Quite obviously, reenacting
precisely the same language is a strange way to make a change.").
105. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843
{1984). If the court finds that Congress's clear intent was to exclude hardship-to-households
evidence, it must uphold the FCS's regulation without reaching step two of Chevron. 467
U.S. at 842-43.
106. As noted above, both circuits to consider this issue have found Congress's intent to
be unambiguous, and did not reach the issue of whether the FCS's action was arbitrary and
capricious. See Kim v. United States, 121 F.3d 1269, 1276 {9th Cir. 1997); Ghattas v. United
States, 40 F.3d 281, 285 (8th Cir. 1994). Because these courts disagreed about what Con
gress's "unambiguous" mandate was, it is possible that future courts will find Congress's
mandate ambiguous, and reach the second step of the Chevron test.

June 1998]

Note - Food Stamp Trafficking

2175

reasons behind the exclusion and has failed to consider compelling
evidence that permanent disqualification harms the intended bene
ficiaries of the food stamp program. The Supreme Court requires
agencies to explain the rationale behind their rules.107 When the
FCS promulgated its regulations, it did not discuss the reasons be
hind its decision to exclude the hardship-to-households defense in
innocent-owner cases.108 A court could legitimately find the rule
arbitrary and capricious based solely on the agency's failure to ex
plain the evidence and rationale supporting its action.109
2.

The Evidence of the Need for a Hardship-to-Households
Defense

A court could uphold the regulation at the second step of the
lack of explanation if the rule is a
rational one based on the available evidence.110 In this case the
agency has provided no evidence to consider.111 Much of the evi
dence that exists suggests that the agency's decision to exclude
hardship-to-households evidence cannot reasonably be reconciled
with the Food Stamp Act's general purpose, providing healthier
food to people who otherwise might not be able to afford it,112 and
the rule is therefore arbitrary and capricious under the second step
of the Chevron test.

Chevron test despite the agency's

There is strong evidence that food stamp households may expe
rience hardship when stores are permanently disqualified.113 De
spite the positive impact of the Food Stamp Act, it has become
increasingly difficult for lower-income households in the inner city
107. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. of the United States v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) ("[T]he agency must examine the relevant data and articulate a
satisfactory explanation for its action . . . .").
108. See Food Stamp Program; Civil Money Penalties in Lieu of Permanent Disqualifica
tion for Trafficking, 55 Fed. Reg. 31,809 (1990) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 278) (including
no discussion of hardship-to-households evidence). This is analogous to the agency's failure
to provide an explanation of its ten-day response requirement. See discussion supra Part LB.
109. See State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43.
110. See State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43 (explaining that an agency rule would be arbitrary and
capricious if the agency based its decision on the wrong factors, or offered an explanation
that was counter to the evidence).
111. See supra text accompanying note 108.
112. See supra notes 97-100 and accompanying text.
113. See, e.g., Mitchell, supra note 99, at Bl ("Most of the stores eliminated from the
program were in the county's poor urban areas where the need is greatest . . . ."). The
hardship may extend beyond food stamp households; a permanent disqualification from the
food stamp program could drive some stores out of business, forcing all consumers to travel
farther to purchase groceries. See Cross v. United States, 512 F.2d 1212, 1217 (4th Cir. 1975)
(en bane) ("[D]isqualification may have grave economic consequences to a retailer engaged
in business in a depressed economic area where there is widespread use of food stamps. In
such an area one who holds himself out as a retailer of food would be cut off from a substan
tial segment of the buying public if he is disqualified from engaging in food stamp
transactions.").
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to benefit from the program. Poorer neighborhoods are less likely
than wealthier neighborhoods to have full-service supermarkets,
which are located primarily in the suburbs.114 Instead, poor neigh
borhoods are more likely to have small convenience stores that pro
vide food that is often less nutritious and higher priced than the
food at grocery stores.115 The urban grocery stores that do remain
in the inner city may do a high percentage of their business in food
stamps, meaning that a permanent disqualification from the pro114. In high-poverty ur�an areas, 35.2% of the stores participating in the food stamp
program are small groceries, while only 7.8% are supermarkets. See OFFICE OF ANALYSIS &
EVALUATION, U.S. DEPT. OF AoRic., Fooo RETAILERS IN THE Fooo STAMP PROGRAM:
CHARACTERISTICS AND SERVICE TO PARTICIPANI"S 15 tbl.6 (1997) [hereinafter CHARACTER·
ISTics]. In low-poverty urban areas, 39.8% of the participating stores are supermarkets,
while 5.1 % are small groceries. See id. The same degree of imbalance between poverty
bands also exists in mixed and rural areas, although to a lesser extent. See id. at 16-17 &
tbls.7-8. These small groceries are less likely to have the kind of selection available in super
markets. See id. at 24 & tbl.11 (showing that supermarkets have an average of 95% of the
FCS's standard "market basket," while stores that are not supermarkets or large groceries
have an average of 44% of the market basket); see also Charles Boisseau, Few Choices for
Shoppers: Survey Reveals Dearth ofInner-city Markets, HoUSTON CHRON., May 17, 1995, at
2C ("Residents of low-income neighborhoods in Houston and other U.S. cities have fewer
and smaller supermarkets at which to shop than folks in higher-income areas
") ; Sarah
Okeson, The Grocery Gap, PEORIA J. STAR, Mar. 31, 1996, at Bl. New development of
"supercenters," stores with both full-service supermarkets and other merchandise, has also
been concentrated outside of urban areas. See Fred Faust, Wal-Mart Starting to Satisfy Large
Appetite for Food, ST. Loms PosT-DISPATCH, June 29, 1997, at IE ("As it did with its dis
count stores, Wal-Mart seems to be focusing on small towns for its supercenters, forming
rings around major metropolitan areas."). Some chains are, however, planning to open su
permarkets in inner-city areas, according to the Food Marketing Institute, a supermarket
trade association. See Boisseau, supra, at 2C.
. . . •

115. The FCS's data support the proposition that small grocery stores are more expensive
than supermarkets. At supermarkets in high-poverty urban areas, the cost of the FCS's mar
ket basket is 102% the cost of the same market basket at an average supermarket. See
CHARACTERISTICS, supra note 114, at 22 & tbl.9. At small grocery stores, the price jumps to
141 % of the cost at an average supermarket. See id.; see also Boisseau, supra note 114, at 2C
("[P]oor families [are forced] to shop at small grocery and convenience stores where they pay
higher prices for less-nutritious food."); Okeson, supra note 114, at Bl ("[Velmon Cleveland]
refuses to shop at the nearby Downtown 66 gas station, where Inilk is $2.79 a gallon and eggs
are $1.79 a dozen, a third higher than to almost double the prices at a discount grocery
store.").
The poor nutritional value of convenience store food is so widely accepted that it has even
become a subject for satire:
"I suddenly realized that I was trapped in the [Kwik-E-Mart] with
no food!"
"But Uncle Apu, what about the heat lamp dogs and nacho chips with synthetic cheese
covering?"
"Tsk, tsk. How soon you seem to be forgetting lesson 12 - 'Food from Kwik-E can make
you sicky. "'
Matt Groening, Apu Nahasapeemapetilon's Kwik-E·Comics, in SIMPSONS COMICS: STRIKE
BACK! 61, 65 (1996).
At urban supermarkets, the situation is somewhat better. The FCS notes that "[a]Ithough
the cost, availability, and quality of food do not vary between urban supermarkets in high
poverty and other areas, the total shopping experience does. Supermarkets in high-poverty
urban areas offer substantially fewer full-service departments and non-food product lines
than supermarkets in other areas." CHARACTERISTICS, supra note 114, at 25.
. . •
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gram could have a crippling effect on stores,116 potentially reducing
service to already underserved food stamp households.
The fact that food stamp households may suffer when retailers
are disqualified suggests that the FCS did not consider the potential
hardship to food stamp households when it carved out an exception
to the usual rule permitting hardship-to-households evidence. Any
"permissible construction of the statute"117 must take into account
the impact on food stamp program participants.118 Because inner
city neighborhoods are already underserved by grocery stores, the
FCS's harsh actions may serve to widen the "grocery gap."119 The
FCS's regulation means that even if a store is the sole provider of
healthy, inexpensive food in a poor urban1 20 neighborhood, an in
nocent-owner violation could force neighborhood food stamp users
to go to convenience stores where they would pay more for food
with less nutritional value.121 Courts should find that to be an un
reasonable construction of the statutory goal of "raising levels of
nutrition among low-income households."1 22
Innocent owners should be allowed to present evidence that
their store's closure will harm food stamp households. If the store
facing disqualification is the best store in a poor neighborhood or
the only store easily accessed in a particular neighborhood, the
store's closure could have a negative impact on food stamp house116. The average small or medium grocery store redeems approximately $46,000 per year
in food stamps. See RETAILER ACITVITY REPORT, supra note 58, at 4. By definition, small
groceries have annual gross sales of under $500,000. See CHARACTERISTICS, supra note 114,
at 5. This means that a small grocery doing the maximum possible business for a small gro
cery, with an average food stamp redemption program, would be losing almost 10% of its
business by losing its food stamp privileges.
117. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843
(1984).
118. See supra notes 97-100 and accompanying text.
119. See Okeson, supra note 114, at Bl ("A study by the Food Marketing Policy Center at
the University of Connecticut . . . found that lower-income areas had fewer grocery stores
than more affluent neighborhoods.").
120. While many food stamp recipients are urban, one Republican Congressman from a
rural district noted that his constituents would also benefit from the availability to stores of a
hardship-to-households defense. See House Panel Approves Food-Stamp Bill, 46 CoNG. Q.
WKLY. REP., 1995, 1995 (1988) ("[Congressman Bill] Emerson said the added [Secretarial]
discretion [is] needed because stores [are] being disqualified for small infractions and in some
rural areas, only one store is available to serve a co=unity.").
121. See Kim v. United States, 121 F.3d 1269, 1276 (9th Cir. 1997) (acknowledging "the
obvious merit of considering hardship to food stamp households in the section 2021(b)(3)(B)
calculus").
The majority of trafficking offenses are taking place at small stores, which do not always
provide the high-quality food that people in poor neighborhoods need. See THE EXTENT OF
TRAFFICKING, supra note 66, at 4. Trafficking is higher at all stores in poor neighborhoods,
however, see id., and the hardship-to-households evidence exclusion applies to all stores,
even those that do provide high quality food and service, see 7 C.F.R. § 278.6(f)(l) (1994).
122. 7 u.s.c. § 2011 (1994).
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holds, denying them the healthy food that Congress intended the
Food Stamp Act to provide for them.
III.

JumcIAL REVIEW OF THE FCS's SANCTIONS

If 7-Van Drugs had made a timely request for a hearing, then
regardless of what evidence it was allowed to present at that hear
ing, the FCS would have been forced to consider what the most
appropriate sanction for the store would have been: either perma
nent disqualification or a civil monetary penalty.123 If the agency
had decided to administer the civil monetary penalty, 7-Van hardly
would have escaped without being penalized. The FCS's penalty
formula guarantees that most stores will pay the maximum possible
fine for innocent-owner violations, $40,000,124 which can be devas
tating to stores with low annual budgets and narrow profit margins.
Regardless of which penalty they received at the hearing, the
owners of 7-Van could have then challenged the penalty in court
under the Food Stamp Act's de novo review provision. While some
courts would have heard 7-Van's case, some courts have refused to
review the agency's sanction. Section III.A argues that the courts'
de novo review should include the agency's sanction.1zs Section
III.B criticizes the FCS's penalty formula as arbitrary, capricious,
and contrary to the purposes of the statute.
A.

Sanctions Under the Food Stamp Act Are Subject to De Novo
Review

The de novo review provision of the Food Stamp Act does not
include an exception for courts' consideration of agency sanc
tions.126 The term "validity" in the de novo review provision means
that courts must compare the agency's sanction to the statutory
scheme, not only to the agency's own regulations.127 Courts that
compare the agency's sanction to the agency's own regulations and
then halt their inquiry128 are not fulfilling the requirements of the
123. See 7 U.S.C. § 202l{b)(3)(B) (Supp. II 1996); 7 C.F.R. § 278.6(b).
124. See 7 C.F.R. § 278.60).
125. This section addresses the merits of the argument referred to in note 33, supra, and
the accompanying text.
126. See 7 U.S.C. § 2023(15) (1994) ("The suit in the United States district court or State
court shall be a trial de novo by the court in which the court shall determine the validity of
the questioned administrative action . . . . ").
127. Compare K-Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 291 (1988) ("In determining
whether a challenged regulation is valid, a reviewing court must first determine if the regula
tion is consistent with the language of the statute.") with Goldstein v. United States, 9 F.3d
521, 523 (6th Cir. 1993) ("If the agency properly applied [its] regulations, then the court's job
is done and the sanction must be enforced."); see also discussion supra Part I.A.
128. The Sixth Circuit has consistently done this. See Bakal Bros. v. United States, 105
F.3d 1085, 1089 (6th Cir. 1997); Goldstein, 9 F.3d at 524; Woodard v. United States, 725 F.2d
1072, 1076-78 (6th Cir. 1984); Martin v. United States, 459 F.2d 300, 301 (6th Cir. 1972) ("TI1e
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statute. Courts considering actions brought under the Food Stamp
Act should therefore review de novo all of the issues raised, includ
ing sanctions.129
The Supreme Court held in United States v. First City National
Bank130 that courts undertaking de novo review of an agency action
should not defer to any agency findings.131 Courts considering the
validity of the FCS's sanctions therefore need not be influenced by
the FCS's determinations.132 The scope of review under the Food
Stamp Act is broader than review under the Administrative Proce
dure Act, which allows only consideration under the arbitrary and
capricious standard.133 De novo review requires courts to make an

statute authorizes a review only on the merits of the cases, and not on the period of disquali
fication."). See also Thay, Inc. v. United States, No. 97-1558, 1997 WL 741365, at *2 (4th Cir.
Dec. 2, 1997) (per curiam) (unpublished) (citing Goldstein).
129. See Freedman v. United States Dept. of Agric., 926 F.2d 252, 261 (3d Cir. 1991) ("[7
U.S.C. § 2023] requires the district court to examine the entire range of issues raised . . . . ");
Modica v. United States, 518 F.2d 374, 376 (5th Cir. 1975).
130. 386 U.S. 361, 368 (1967) ("[T]he . . . Act provides that the court . . . 'shall review de
the issues presented.' . . . The critical words to us seem to be 'de nova' and 'issues
presented.' They mean to us that the court shonld make an independent determination of
the issues.'').

novo

131. The First City National Bank case dealt with particular administrative decisions, not
an agency rule of the kind discussed here. The discussion of First City National Bank is
included only to explain the standards of de novo review, which apply to all agency actions
under the Food Stamp Act. See 7 U.S.C. § 2023(a) (1994). An agency rule, such as 7 C.F.R.
§ 278, is considered an agency action. See Food Stamp Program; Civil Money Penalties in
Lieu of Permanent Disqualification for Trafficking, 55 Fed. Reg. 31,809 (1990) (to be codified
at 7 C.F.R. pt. 278) ("7 CFR Part 278 . . . ACTION: Fmal rule . . . . This final ritle establishes
eligibility criteria for firms seeking a civil money penalty in lieu of a permanent disqualifica
tion for trafficking . . . . This action is effective retroactively to October 1, 1988.'').
132. The Food Stamp Act language differs slightly from the language of the statute con
sidered in First City National Bank, but preserves the important "de novo" language. See 7
U.S.C. § 2023(a) ("The suit . . . shall be a trial de novo . . . in which the court shall determine
the validity of the questioned administrative action in issue . . . .''). The critical difference in
the Food Stamp Act language is the inclusion of the word "validity.'' See Martin v. United
States, 459 F.2d 300, 302 (6th Cir. 1972) (Edwards, J., dissenting) ("My brothers construe the
language which follows 'trial de novo by the court' as a limitation upon that term. On its
face, however, the phrase 'in which the court shall determine the validity of the questioned
administrative action in issue' describes but does not limit.''); see also Doe v. United States,
821 F.2d 694, 708 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (en bane) (Wald, C.J., dissenting) ("The term 'de novo' is
hardly vague - to a court of law. . . . The court should determine the matter 'anew,' BLAcK's
LAW DrcnoNARY 392 (5th ed. 1979), without deference to the prior administrative proceed
ings and decision.'').
133.

Compare 7 U.S.C. § 2023(a) (1994) with 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1997)

("[T]he review

ing court shall decide all relevant questions of law . . . and determine the meaning or applica
bility of the terms of an agency action. The reviewing court shall . . . hold unlawful and set
aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be . . . arbitrary, capricious, an abuse
of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law . . . .'') ; see also Ibrahim v. United
States, 834 F.2d 52, 53 (2d Cir. 1987) ("The Food Stamp Act's de novo review provision
embodies a different and broader scope of review than that available under the APA, 5
U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)."); Modica, 518 F.2d at 376.
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independent determination of the issues presented, without being
bound by the administrative record.134
Courts have sometimes mistakenly used the term "validity" to
narrow the de novo review of sanctions to review under the Butz v.
Glover standard.135 In Glover, the Court held that agency sanctions
are not to be overturned unless found to be unwarranted in law or
without justification in fact.136 Under the Glover standard, courts
protect stores from the most badly misguided agency decisions
while still showing deference to agency expertise.137 Glover, how
ever, resolved an action brought by a company found in violation of
the Packers and Stockyards Act, which has no provision for de novo
review.138 The standard of review in Glover was therefore derived
from the Administrative Procedure Act (APA),139 and is not analo
gous to de novo review under the Food Stamp Act.14°
There is a suggestion that Congress intended to narrow the
scope of review to approximate the APA standard more closely, but
that suggestion need not be followed by courts. According to the
legislative history of the 1977 Food Stamp Act amendments, the
House Committee on Agriculture thought that review of agency
sanctions under the Act should not be conducted de novo.141 That
134. See First City Natl. Bank, 386 U.S. at 368 (citing with approval a comment in the
legislative record that in de novo review, a court should not "give any special weight to the
determination of the . . . supervisory agency").
135. See, e.g., Kulkin v. Bergland, 626 F.2d 181, 184-85 (1st Cir. 1980) ("While the de
novo review provision of the Food Stamp Act raises certain problems, it does not, in our
view, call for a departure from the usual standard of review concerning sanctions .
[We]
believe the court must still be guided by the concepts implicit in the Butz v. Glover Livestock
Commission Co. standard."). The Kulkin standard is still followed in the Frrst Circuit, see
Massachusetts Dept. of Pub. Welfare v. Secretary of Agric., 984 F.2d 514, 520 (1993), and is
also the standard adopted by the Sixth Circuit in Goldstein v. United States, 9 F.3d 521, 523
(6th Cir. 1993) (citing Ku/kin).
136. 411 U.S. 182, 185-86 (1973).
137. See Kulkin, 626 F.2d at 185 ("From a practical standpoint, it would not make sense
for a court to substitute its judgment for that of the agency charged \vith administering the
food stamp program as to the appropriate penalty for a given violation."); Nowicki v. United
States, 536 F.2d 1171, 1178 (7th Cir. 1976) ("[W]e feel compelled to reverse that part of the
judgment of the district court which reduced the sanction . . . as an impermissible intrusion
into the administrative domain . . . . "); Cross v. United States, 512 F.2d 1212, 1218 (4th Cir.
1975) (en bane) ("[T]he scope of review of a sanction is not as broad as the scope of review of
the fact of violation. The more limited scope of review of a sanction results from the vesting
of discretion by Congress in the Secretary to devise and administer a scheme of disqualifica
tions . . . .").
138. See Packers and Stockyards Act, 7 U.S.C. § 210(f) (1994). Section 210 has been
amended only once since Glover, and the amendment made no change to § 210(f). See 7
U.S.C. § 210 note (Amendments).
139. See Glover, 411 U.S. at 185.
140. See supra notes 130-34 and accompanying text (explaining the differences between
de novo review and review under the Administrative Procedure Act).
141. See H.R. REP. No. 95-345, at 397-98, reprinted in 1997 U.S.C.C.A.N: 2326-27 ("[T]he
Committee does not intend that, in the trial de novo in the United States district court or
state court of the final administrative determination of disqualification, the sanction or pe.
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legislative history has been used to justify applying the arbitrary
and capricious standard to agency sanctions administered under the
Food Stamp Act.142 Despite the commentary in the legislative his
tory, however, Congress did not change the language of the statute
itself.143 Without any change in the language of the statute, the pre1977 cases holding that review of agency sanctions should be de
novo cannot be considered overruled.144 Courts should therefore
undertake de novo review of agency sanctions under the Food
Stamp Act.
B.

The Inappropriateness of the FCS's Civil Monetary Penalty
Formula

The FCS's penalty formula is ill-suited for innocent-owner cases.
The penalty formula is based solely on a retailer's honest food
stamps redemptions, and thus punishes an innocent owner for doing
good business.145 Even under an arbitrary and capricious standard,
this formula hardly seems to make "the punishment . . . more
closely fit the crime" as the legislative history to the amendments
suggests it should.146
The FCS's penalty provision fails to make meaningful distinc
tions based on the seriousness of the crime and the effect the fine
will have on the store. The FCS has defended its formula by saying
that it "appropriately recognizes variations based upon the severity
of the trafficking offense."147 In the case of first-time offenders,
riod of disqualification imposed would itself be subject to judicial review as several courts
have held that it is
The trial de nova . . . should be limited to the determination of the
validity of the administrative action, but not of the severity of the sanction." (citations
omitted)).
142. See, e.g., Broad St. Food Mkt., Inc. v. United States, 720 F.2d 217, 219-20 (1st Cir.
1983).
143. See Hough v. United States Dept. of Agric., 707 F.2d 866, 868 n.1 (5th Cir. 1983)
(per curiam) ("What Congress intended to do is thus plain enough, but what it actually did
do is another matter entirely. . . . [Congress] reenact[ed] the 1964 provisions without, for our
purposes, making any changes at all. The intent . . . stated in the legislative history, in other
words, seems not to have found expression in the statute itself." (citations omitted)).
144. See Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 567 (1988) ("Quite obviously, reenacting
precisely the same language is a strange way to make a change."). Although there was no
change in the language of the statute, the 1977 legislative history specifically disapproves of
those cases that had reviewed the sanction de nova. See H.R. REP. No. 95-464, at 706 (1997).
145. See 7 C.F.R. § 278.60) (1994) (showing that the only variable in the formula is the
store's average monthly food stamp redemption).
146. See H.R. REP. No. 100-828, at 28; see also Corder v. United States, 107 F.3d 595, 598
(8th Cir. 1997) ("[A] fine based entirely on this formula . . . must be overturned as arbitrary,
capricious, and contrary to the statute."). But see Vasudeva v. United States, No. C96-1252Z,
1998 WL 279223, at *7 (W.D. Wash. May 27, 1998) (finding that the FCS's formula is not
arbitrary and capricious: "An agency may decide to exclude certain factors from a formula
because evaluating those factors accurately costs more than any benefit gained.").
147. Food Stamp Program; Civil Money Penalties in Lieu of Disqualification for Traffick
ing, 55 Fed. Reg. 31,809, 31,810 (1990) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 278).
. • . •
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"recognizing variations" means simply that the fine is doubled if the
trafficking offense involved more than $99 in food stamps.148 Other
than doubling the fine if the offense was for $99 or more, the only
variable in the penalty formula is how much food stamp business a
store transacts, a variable that the agency puts through a series of
multipliers to determine the penalty.149

In practice, the multistep formula promulgated by the FCS al
ways leads to the same simple conclusion: the fine for a store's first
violation is exactly half of the store's annual food stamp redemp
tions for violations involving $99 or less in food stamps, and is ex
actly the store's annual food stamp redemptions for violations of
$100 or more in food stamps.150 The fine for the second violation is
twice that.151 Because the maximum penalty is $20,000 for each vi
olation, with no more than a $40,000 penalty for each investiga
tion,152 the formula dictates that any store that redeems more than
$40,000 in food stamps in a given calendar year will receive the
maximum penalty for any employee-trafficking violation.153
Many stores with food stamp redemption programs do, in fact,
redeem much more than $40,000 a year in food stamps.154 The
formula guarantees that all of these stores will receive the maxi
mum possible fine, without recognizing any variation in the severity
of the offense.155 The maximum penalty is also the probable sanc
tion for stores with annual redemptions between $20,000 and
148. See 7 C.F.R. § 278.60)(3) ("For the first trafficking offense by a firm, [apply formula]
amount . . . involved in a single trafficking transaction had a face value of $99 or
less. If the . . . value . . . was $100 or more, the amount of the product obtained in this
paragraph shall be doubled . . . .").
149. See 7 C.F.R. § 278.60)(1)-(3) ("Multiply the average monthly redemption figure by
10 percent . . . multiply the product obtained . . . by 60 . . . .").
150. Working through the formula: "X" represents a store's annual food stamp redemp
tions. Tue first step of the formula is to convert that to a monthly figure, X/12. See 7 C.F.R.
§ 278.60)(1). This figure is then multiplied by 10%, bringing the figure to X/120. See 7
C.F.R. § 278.60)(2). Tue figure is then multiplied by 60, bringing the total to 60X/120, or
X/2. See 7 C.F.R. § 278.60)(3). This total, X/2 (half of the annual redemptions), is the final
fine for violations of "$99 or less." See 7 C.F.R. § 278.60)(3). If the transaction was "$100 or
more," the X/2 total is doubled, leaving a fine of X, the annual food stamp redemption total.
See 7 C.F.R. § 278.60)(3).
151. See 7 C.F.R. § 278.60)(4) (multiplying by 120 instead of 60, as it does for the first
offense).
152. See 7 U.S.C. § 2021(b)(3)(B) (Supp. II 1996).
153. See 7 C.F.R. § 278.60).
154. Based on data from fiscal year 1994, the average medium or small grocery in the
food stamp program redeems approximately $46,000 in food stamps annually - a far cry
from the $540,000 redeemed annually at the average supermarket in the food stamp program,
but still enough to receive the maximum fine. See RETAILER AcnvITY REPORT, supra note
58, at 4.
155. See Corder v. United States, 107 F.3d 595, 598 (8th Cir. 1997) ("Tue formula . . .
applies a series of arithmetic multipliers designed, as best we can determine, to guarantee
that nearly every unknowing first offender will incur the statutory maximum $40,000
penalty.").
if the largest
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$40,000, because the higher penalty applies for any violation involv
ing more than $100. Many trafficking offenses involve more than
$100 in food stamps.156 Even small-time operators routinely con
duct illegal food stamp trafficking violations over $100.157 Because
the threshold is so low, the maximum penalty will be assessed to
stores with annual food stamp redemptions of $20,000 or more.158
The fine can cripple small inner-city stores with low profit mar
gins.159 This is particularly harsh because the owner of the store has
not benefited from the illegal transaction.160
The FCS has the flexibility to improve the formula by adding
new criteria.161 Because the statute does not explicitly enumerate
criteria for consideration in the formula, the FCS could incorporate,
for example, the criteria for criminal fines.162 These criteria could
include, as they do now, the store's income and financial re
sources.163 The formula could also distinguish between large and
small stores and consider whether the store has taken any action
against the employee(s) involved in the illegal traf:ficking;164 and it
could consider whether the fine will cause other people, such as
156. In Fiscal Year 1994, the FCS conducted 902 trafficking investigations, involving
$224,503 in food stamps and $124,779 in cash. See RETAILER ACTIVITY REPORT, supra note
58, at 12 tbl. The average investigation therefore involved approximately $250 in food
stamps and $140 in cash, easily enough to qualify for the higher penalty.
157. See Bakal Bros., v. United States, 105 F.3d 1085, 1087 (6th Cir. 1997) ("[A 17-year
old store clerk] followed [the officer] into the parking lot and offered to purchase food
stamps. The officer then sold [him] $270 in food stamps for $150 in cash."); see also Emshwil
ler, supra note 66, at Bl ("An early and typical Cleveland case involved Amin Salem, cur
rently serving a 42-month prison sentence for his role in some $6.6 million of illegal food
stamp transactions."); Dean Murphy, Spotlight Shines on Food Stamp Fraud, L.A. TIMES,
Feb. 7, 1994, at Bl ("[A] Los Angeles man was sentenced to 15 months in prison last year
after he sold $29,400 in food stamps to an undercover agent for $25,000 in cash. Agents also
found $82,000 in food stamps in the man's home.").
158. See 7 C. F.R.

§ 278.6G).

159. Take the example of a small grocery store with average sales of $200,000, which
redeems $20,000 in food stamps annually. If an employee sells $100 in food stamps for cash
on two separate occasions, the store can be subjected to the maximum $40,000 penalty. This
means the store would lose 20% of its annual income, not profits. This could be devastating
in an industry that traditionally has very low profit margins. See Faust, supra note 114, at lE
("Margins on food are notoriously tight.").
160. See 7 U.S.C. § 2021(b)(3)(B)(i) (1994) ("[N]either the ownership nor management
of the store . . . was aware of, approved, benefited from, or was involved in the conduct or
approval of the violation . . . . ").
161. See Vasudeva v. United States, No. C96-1252Z, 1998 WL 279223, at *7 (W.D. Wash.
May 27, 1998) ("Agency discretion is exercised . . . in the choice among formulas.").
162. Cf. First Am. Bank v. Dole, 763 F.2d 644, 651 n.6 (4th Cir. 1985) ("Civil penalties
may be considered 'quasi-criminal' in nature.").
163. See 18 U.S.C.

§ 3572(a)(l)

(1994) (regulating criminal sentences).

164. See 18 U.S.C. § 3572 (a)(l), (8) ("[T]he court shall consider . . . the size of the [de
fendant] organization and any measure taken by the organization to discipline any officer,
director, employee, or agent of the organization responsible for the offense and to prevent a
recurrence of such an offense . . . . ").
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food stamp consumers, to suffer any :financial loss.165 Courts should
find the current formula arbitrary and capricious because it allows
the agency to administer the maximum fine in too many cases; the
FCS should be forced to develop a formula that meets the statutory
goal of making the fine appropriate for the particular violation.
CONCLUSION

The FCS has consistently misinterpreted the Food Stamp Act's
purpose in promulgating regulations relating to innocent-owner vi
olations. It has erected procedural hurdles that prevent innocent
owners from accessing statutory procedures designed for their ben
efit, it prevents them from presenting compelling evidence that
their punishment should be mitigated, and it applies a penalty
formula that imposes the maximum penalty for even minor offenses
in small stores. The cumulative effect of its regulations is to harm
small stores, and to reduce the Food Stamp Program's impact on
the poor communities that need its help the most.
In the case of 7-Van Drugs, the opportunity to present evidence
on its own behalf might have allowed the store to keep its food
stamp privileges - at some cost, but perhaps not an unreasonable
one. Instead, a teenaged clerk's personal greed has forced the store
from the food stamp program. Even the court that upheld the
FCS's sanction was concerned that the result it reached might be
unjust.166 While that court agreed with the FCS's misinterpretation
of the Food Stamp Act, future courts reviewing FCS actions under
the Food Stamp Act's de novo review provision should force the
FCS to comply with Congress's statutory scheme and stop the FCS
from trampling on the rights of small grocery store owners in poor
neighborhoods.

165. See 18 U.S.C. § 3572(a){l), (7) ("[T]he court shall consider . . . any pecuniary loss
inflicted upon others as a result of the offense . . . [and] whether the defendant can pass on to
consumers or other persons the expense of the fine
).
166. See Baka! Bros., v.United States, 105 F.3d 1085, 1090 (6th Cir. 1997) ("[W]e sympa
thize with plaintiff's position . . . . ).
. • . ."
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